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Abstract 
While currency crises have been extensively studied, the opposite phenomenon, 
large appreciations, has been far less researched, in spite of strong interest in 
policy circles and in the media. We fill this gap by providing a theoretical analysis 
and an empirical exploration of large real exchange rate appreciations. We 
develop a simple model that contrasts the pattern of exchange rate and growth 
depending on the underlying shock. The model shows that an appreciation 
stemming from a productivity boom leads to a stronger growth than the same 
appreciation stemming from a surge of capital inflows. We then use a sample of 
30 advanced and 38 emerging market economies, with annual data going back to 
1960, and focus on the connection between large appreciations and output growth. 
Our first empirical finding is that, while countries faced with large real exchange 
rate appreciations experience significantly lower export growth and higher import 
growth, this impact on trade flows does not translate into overall output growth. 
Second, we find supporting evidence for our theoretical patterns in a panel 
regression, as growth tends to be higher during the appreciation episodes 
associated with productivity shocks than those associated with surges of capital 
inflows.  
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1. Introduction  
Currency crises (large real exchange rate depreciations) have figured very prominently on the 
research agenda of international macroeconomics for several decades. Their adverse effects have 
been broadly documented, leading academics and policy makers to develop tools to detect when 
the economy is at risk of a crisis and policies to limit their impact, such as limiting exchange rate 
movements – a pattern known as “fear of floating” (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002). 
In contrast, relatively little is known about the effect of large appreciations, even though 
concerns about such phenomena are clearly pervasive in the policy debate. Sharp appreciations 
can lead to a loss in competitiveness and therefore may reduce growth through net trade. This 
fear has been repeatedly expressed by several policy makers.1. While the recent concern about 
“currency wars” – where the expansionary monetary policy in advanced economies leads to 
capital flows to emerging markets and an appreciation of their currencies – has been widely 
noted, the concern is not limited to emerging markets. Japanese policy makers for instance have 
repeatedly expressed their worries, having experienced several episodes of large real exchange 
rate appreciations, in the early 1970s in the wake of the Smithsonian Agreement, from 1985 to 
1995 after the Plaza Accord, and in the current crisis.2 The concern is however not universally 
shared. Paul Krugman (1994) has dubbed it “a dangerous obsession” and argues that “concerns 
about competitiveness are, as an empirical matter, almost completely unfounded”.  
This active debate raises the question whether large appreciations indeed have an adverse effect 
on growth, a point that has not been firmly established. This paper takes a step towards filling the 
gap. We first provide a theoretical framework that illustrates the joint determination of the real 
exchange rate and growth, and stresses the how the patterns for these two variables depend on 
the specific underlying shock. We then assemble a large dataset of 68 countries (30 advanced 
                                                            
1 Two quotes illustrate these different views. On the one hand, Mishkin (2007) clearly expresses concern about the 
competitiveness channel (“An appreciation of the dollar, in turn, restrains exports (because the price of U.S. goods 
rises when measured in foreign currencies) and stimulates imports (because imports become cheaper in dollar 
terms). The resulting decrease in net exports implies a reduction in aggregate demand”). On the other hand, Noyer 
(2007) brings a more balanced view: “It is clear that the price-competitiveness of French industries has deteriorated 
significantly in recent years. Has the euro’s appreciation played a role in this? On the one hand, it undoubtedly 
penalises export sectors whose competitors are located in other monetary areas. But, on the other hand, it benefits 
those sectors which are large consumers of imported commodities. At this stage, the overall effect on France’s 
growth and external balance is not clearly apparent”. 
2 There is even a special word in Japanese to refer to a period of strong appreciation (“endaka”). 
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economies and 38 emerging markets), with annual data from 1960 to 2011, and empirically 
assess the impact of large and sustained appreciation on key macroeconomic variables. Our 
empirical findings are in lines with the implications from the model. 
Specifically, our theoretical analysis considers a simple model with differentiated traded and 
non-traded sectors, where the economy is subjected to sectoral productivity shocks, shocks to the 
sectoral allocation of demand, and shocks to the time discount factor. We first consider a simple 
version with a homogeneous traded good and show that the Home country’s real exchange rate 
appreciates when productivity increases in the Home traded sector, when Home demand shifts 
towards non-traded goods, and when the propensity to save in the Foreign country increases, a 
proxy for a surge in capital inflows. A given appreciation can thus be associated with very 
different growth patterns depending on the nature of the shock. While an appreciation is 
accompanied by higher growth, this is much more pronounced following a productivity shock 
than following a capital inflows shock. The pattern is robust to extending the model to include 
differentiated traded goods, especially for capital inflows shocks. The connection between 
growth and productivity shocks in the more general model is looser, as productivity now has 
offsetting effects on the real exchange rate through the terms-of-trade between traded goods 
(absent in the simple model) and the relative price of non-traded goods. 
The main findings from our empirical exercise can be summarized as follows. First, large 
appreciations are neither uncommon nor limited to emerging economies. We identify 107 
episodes among which about 39 took place in advanced economies. Second, the stylized facts 
show that large appreciations are on average associated with lower exports and higher imports. 
While this would comfort policy makers worrying about the growth effects of large 
appreciations, our third result is that the pattern for net trade does not translate into a similar 
pattern for overall growth. This result therefore puts fears about the growth impact of large 
appreciations in perspective. Fourth, we document substantial heterogeneity across episodes. In 
particular, we find empirical evidence that appreciations associated with a productivity shock are 
characterized by higher output growth than when appreciations are associated with a surge of 
capital flows (net or gross). 
While the stylized facts outlined above point to the absence of any adverse growth effect, we 
recognize that we cannot limit ourselves to such a broad-brush assessment and undertake a more 
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detailed empirical assessment through a panel analysis. We find that large appreciations tend to 
be associated with lower growth, but that the effect depends crucially on the underlying shock. In 
particular, appreciations stemming from productivity growth are more benign than appreciations 
stemming from surges of capital inflows, in line with our theoretical exercise. We also find that 
global investors’ attitude toward risk, proxied by the VXO index, matter. First, a country faced 
with a surge of gross inflows when investors are relaxed about risk tends to experience lower 
growth when the surge leads to a large appreciation. Second, a country faced with a surge of net 
inflows when investors are highly concerned about risk tends to experience lower growth, 
without necessarily facing a large appreciation. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 
presents a simple model and contrasts the growth pattern in appreciation episodes depending on 
the nature of the underlying shock. Section 4 introduces the definition of large exchange rate 
appreciations, and presents key stylized facts. A panel econometric analysis is undertaken in 
Section 5. Section 6 concludes and presents possible policy implications.  
 
2. Review of the literature 
As the exchange rate is a major economic variable, large exchange rate movements have long 
attracted a lot of attention among policy makers and researchers. However, existing studies have 
predominantly focused on episodes of weakening currencies, i.e. sharp depreciations, or currency 
crises. This is understandable given that currency crises generally have powerful adverse effects 
on growth, as documented by Cerra and Saxena (2008) and Bussière, Saxena and Tovar (2012), 
among others. Accordingly, statistical tools have been developed to detect currency crises before 
they strike. Existing approaches include so-called early warning models (Kaminsky, Lizondo and 
Reinhart, 1998, Goldstein and Reinhart, 2000) and logit models (Frankel and Rose, 1996, 
Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz, 1995, Berg and Pattillo, 1999, Bussière and Fratzscher, 2006). 
While the literature on large appreciation is thinner than the one on currency crises, we are by no 
means the first paper to consider the issue. Kappler et al. (2012) were the first to formally define 
a large exchange rate appreciation and to look at the effects of such episodes on the current 
account balance and on real output. They find that large appreciations lead to deterioration of the 
current account through lower savings and lower exports, the effects being larger in emerging 
and developing economies. They however find little impact on overall GDP as domestic demand 
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and net exports move in opposite directions. We build on their work in several ways. First, we do 
not limit our analysis to countries operating a managed exchange rate. Second, we consider 
cross-country heterogeneity in addition to average responses, as some countries faced with a 
large appreciation manage to grow at a robust pace, while others seem to be particularly affected.  
Third, we consider the underlying reasons for the appreciation. While nontrivial, such a 
distinction is important as a given appreciation can be associated with very different movements 
in growth depending on the driving shock. In particular, we distinguish episodes driven by 
movements in international capital flows from episodes driven by domestic productivity shocks. 
Our emphasis on movements in capital flows, which to our knowledge has not been taken 
previously, fits with a growing emphasis in international economics on “capital flow bonanzas” 
(Reinhart and Reinhart 2008) and “lending booms” (Gourinchas et al. 2001). Movements in 
international capital flows can in principle reflect the fundamentals of the particular economy, or 
global fundamentals. A growing body of literature stresses the prominent role of the later. Forbes 
and Warnock (2012a,b) argue that episodes of large movements in capital inflows and outflows 
are associated with changes in global risk, especially for flows in debt instruments, while local 
fundamentals do not have a robust effect. Ghosh et al. (2012) also document the role of global 
factors for episodes of large net flows, with local factors playing a secondary (albeit relevant) 
role. Rey (2013) stresses the relevance of global financial cycles in driving economic conditions, 
regardless of the exchange rate regime.3 A prominent study of episodes of large appreciations is 
Goldfajn and Valdes (1999), who however focus on the persistence and unwinding of episodes 
where the appreciation is out of line with fundamentals, which is a different focus than ours. 
Our paper also relates to other studies on similar issues. Rodrik (2008) focuses on a related (but 
markedly different) concept, that of undervaluation (and overvaluation). He emphasizes that 
“Avoiding overvaluation of the currency is one of the most robust imperatives that can be 
gleaned from the diverse experience with economic growth around the world, and it is one that 
appears to be strongly supported by cross-country statistical evidence”, referring to the work of 
Razin and Collins (1997), Johnson, Ostry, and Subramanian (2007), and Easterly (2005). We 
differ from Rodrik as we focus on large appreciations and do not refer to a particular benchmark, 
                                                            
3 Ghosh et al. (2012) however find that surges of capital flows are less frequent and smaller in countries with 
flexible exchange rates. 
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therefore abstracting from the question of over- or undervaluation. Our approach is motivated by 
the considerable uncertainty that surrounds estimates of equilibrium exchange rates -- see for 
instance the discussion in Bussière et al. (2010).4  
3. A simple model of the real exchange rate 
 
In this section we present a simple model that contrasts the impact of different types of on the 
real exchange rate, output and the current account. For brevity we focus on the main features and 
results, and leave more details to the appendix.5 We first present the building blocks and the 
solution method. We then derive the analytical solution for a simple combination of parameters, 
and present numerical results for the more general parametrization. 
 
3.1 Building blocks 
 
Our setup builds on Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996 chapter 4). We consider a general equilibrium 
model with two countries, Home and Foreign, of sizes n and 1-n respectively. In the Home 
country, a representative agent of size n consumes a basket Ct of traded and non-traded goods, 
with the former consisting of Home and Foreign produced goods: 
      
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where t denotes time, CT,t and CN,t are the consumptions of traded and non-traded goods, 
respectively, and CH,t and CF,t are the consumptions of Home traded and Foreign traded goods, 
respectively. t is the time-varying weight of traded goods in the consumption basket,  is the 
elasticity of substitution between traded and non-traded goods, and  is the elasticity of 
substitution between Home traded and Foreign traded goods.  is the degree of domestic bias in 
traded goods consumption. It lies between zero and one, with zero corresponding to the absence 
of bias. The consumption baskets of the representative agent of size 1-n are similar, with 
asterisks denoting Foreign variables: 
                                                            
4 A given appreciation does not necessarily coincide with an overvaluation: it could be that the exchange rate is 
converging towards a new equilibrium, correcting a past undervaluation. Having said that, the definition we use 
excludes large appreciations that followed a currency crisis: given that such crises are well-known to give rise to an 
overshooting effect, such episodes would most likely correspond to a correction towards an equilibrium value. 
5 The fully detailed steps of the model solution are available on request. 
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While the weight of traded goods in the overall basket can differ across countries, we assume 
that the degree of domestic bias in traded consumption is the same in both. 
The allocation of consumption reflects the various relative prices, namely the price of Home 
traded goods PH,t the price of Foreign traded goods PF,t (both prices are the same in the two 
countries), the price indexes of traded goods PT,t and P*T,t, and the consumer price indexes Pt and 
P*t. The price indexes are: 
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We define the terms-of-trade as the price of Foreign traded goods to Home traded goods, Tt = PF,t 
/ PH,t and the relative prices of non-traded goods relative to traded goods as Rt = PN,t / PT,t and R*t 
= P*N,t / P*T,t. The real exchange rate Qt = P*t / Pt reflects the terms-of-trade (in the presence of 
domestic bias) and the relative prices of non-traded goods: 
  
   
  
  
)1/(1
1
1***)1/(1
1
1
1
1
)1)(1()1(
1)1(








 
















ttt
ttt
t
t
t R
R
Tnnn
Tnnn
Q  
The production of traded and non-traded goods relies on a technology that uses labor with 
decreasing returns to scale. The total labor supply in the Home and Foreign country are set to n 
and 1-n. The outputs of the two sectors in the Home country are YH,t = AH,t (n - LN,t)1- and YN,t = 
AN,t (LN,t)1- where LN,t denotes the labor input in the non-traded sector, and Ai,t is an exogenous 
productivity term in sector i = H, N. The parameter  reflects the degree of returns to scale. The 
case of  = 1 corresponds to an endowment economy, while the case of  = 0 corresponds to 
constant returns to scale. The outputs in the Foreign country are Y*F,t = A*F,t (1 - n - L*N,t)1- and 
Y*N,t = A*N,t (L*N,t)1-. 
Borrowing and lending takes place through a bond denominated in Foreign traded goods, without 
loss of generality. A unit of bond held between period t and t+1 yields an interest rate of 1+rt+1. 
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We denote the per capita holdings of bonds by the Home agent at the end of period t by Bt+1. The 
intertemporal constraints faced by the Home and Foreign agent are: 
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where we used the fact that bonds are in zero net supply worldwide. As in each country the 
consumption of non-traded goods is equal to its supply, we split the constraint in each country 
between the market clearing condition for the non-traded sector: 
   1* ,* ,* ,1,,, )()1(      ;      )( tNtNtNtNtNtN LACnLAnC                                              (1) 
and the intertemporal constraint in terms of traded goods: 
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The clearing of the market for Home traded goods is written as: 
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A similar relation holds for the clearing of the Foreign traded good, but is redundant given (1)-
(4). The appendix presents the expressions for (1)-(4) using the expressions for the intratemporal 
allocation of consumption. 
The Home and Foreign representative agents maximize an intertemporal utility of consumption 
over an infinite horizon: 
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where the discount factors  and * are time varying. 
The intertemporal optimization leads to two conditions for each country. The first ones are the 
Euler conditions for the dynamics of consumption: 
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The second set of conditions reflects the optimal allocation of labor across the traded and non-
traded sectors: 
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The appendix presents the real interest rates in (6) and the allocations (8)-(9) in terms of relative 
prices. Note that when Home and Foreign traded goods are perfect substitutes, so that PH,t = PF,t 
= PT,t = P*T,t and there are constant returns to scale in production, (8)-(9) imply that the relative 
price of non-traded goods only reflects relative productivities: Rt = AH,t / AN,t and R*t = A*F,t / 
A*N,t. 
There are three sources of shocks in the model. The first consists of productivity shocks in the 
traded and non-traded sectors, with exogenous movements in AH,t, AN,t, A*F,t and A*N,t. The 
second are shocks to the allocation of demand between traded and non-traded goods, with 
fluctuations in t and *t, a higher value of either denoting a demand shift towards traded goods. 
The final source of shocks are movements in the discount factors of Home and Foreign agents, t 
and *t. These discount factor shocks can be interpreted as exogenous shifters of international 
capital flows, as an increase patience of Foreign agents translates into capital flows towards the 
Home economy. 
 
3.2 Solution method 
 
As the model is highly non-linear, we approximate it around a symmetric steady state. In that 
steady state, where variables are indexed by 0, agents have the same preferences over traded and 
non-traded goods (0 = *0), and are equally patient (0 = *0 = 0) which removes incentives to 
save and borrow internationally. In addition no country holds claims on the other (B0 = 0). The 
Euler conditions (6) imply that the real interest rates are all equal to the inverse of the discount 
rate. 
The baseline steady-state is characterized by the two market clearing conditions for non-traded 
goods (1), the intertemporal constraints (2)-(3), the market clearing for the Home traded good 
(4), and the labor allocations (8)-(9). For simplicity, we put restrictions on the productivity levels 
so that all relative prices are equal to one, consumption is equalized across countries, and the 
labor allocations reflect the weight of the two sectors in preferences.6 
                                                            
6 Specifically, we have T0 = R0 = R*0 = 1, C0 = C*0 = R0 = AH,0 (n0)-, and LN,0 = n(1-0) and L*N,0 = (1-n)(1-0). 
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We express the model in terms of log-linear approximations around the baseline steady state and 
denote log deviations by hatted values, with for instance 00 /)(ˆ CCCC tt  . As international 
bond holdings are zero in the steady state, we scale them by steady state consumption and define: 
)/(ˆ 00CBB tt  . The approximations of equations (1)-(9) are presented in the appendix. 
We consider that the economy is initially in the baseline steady state, and is hit by unexpected 
shocks. We consider that all shocks follow an autoregressive process: 
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where all the ’s are between zero and one, the ’s are iid innovations, and we define 
00 /)(ˆ   tt   and ))1(/()(ˆ 000   tt . 
In the linearized model, the real exchange rate of the Home country reflects the terms-of-trade 
(to the extent that there is domestic bias in consumption) and the cross-country difference in the 
relative price of non-traded goods: 
)ˆˆ)(1(ˆˆ *0 tttt RRTQ                                                                                              (10) 
An increase in the relative price of non-traded goods in the Home country leads to a real 
appreciation through the standard Harold-Balassa-Samuelson effect. As we allow for imperfect 
substitutability between Home and Foreign traded goods, movements in the term-of-trade also 
matter, and can offset the usual effect through the relative price of non-traded goods. The output 
in the Home sectors and the overall Home output, measured in terms of Home traded goods, are 
written as: 
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As the analytical solution is quite cumbersome for the general model, we first consider a specific 
case, before presenting a numerical illustration of the general case. 
 
3.3 A simple case 
 
We simplify the model in two ways. First, we consider that Home and Foreign goods are perfect 
substitutes (  ), so that there is a common traded good. The terms-of-trade are then always 
11 
 
equal to one, so we lose one endogenous variable as 0ˆ tT . We also lose one equation as the 
market clearing condition (4) corresponds to the sum of (2) and (3). In addition the degree of 
domestic bias  is irrelevant. The second simplification is to set the elasticity of substitution 
between traded and non-traded goods  equal to one. 
It is convenient to first consider the solution in terms of worldwide averages of variables, which 
we denote by a w superscript (for instance: *ˆ)1(ˆˆ ttwt CnCnC  ). We can show that in 
worldwide terms consumption reflects the productivity shocks, while the sectoral allocation of 
output is only driven by demand shocks. The relative price of non-traded good increases when 
productivity gains are tilted towards the traded sector and when demand shifts towards non-
traded goods ( 0ˆ wt ): 
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We then proceed to the solution of the model in terms of cross-country differences, denoting 
relative variables by a d superscript (for instance: *ˆˆˆ ttdt CCC  ). Starting with the solution for 
the Home country’s foreign assets, )1/(ˆ 1 nBt  , we can show that the Home country runs a 
current account surplus when the patience of Home agents increases relative to that of Foreign 
agents ( 0ˆ dt ), when productivity gains in the traded sector are tilted in favor of the Home 
country ( 0ˆ , d tTA ), and when demand in the Home country shift away from traded goods, 
relative to demand in the Foreign country ( 0ˆ dt ): 
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A current account surplus by the Home country is associated with a shift of its labor force 
towards the traded sector, a reduction in its overall consumption, and a real appreciation of its 
currency: 
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In addition to indirect effects through the current account, sectoral productivity differentials 
directly affect the real exchange rate, and the average productivity gap across countries affects 
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consumption. A shift of demand toward traded goods in the Home country pushes labor into that 
sector and leads to a real depreciation as it lowers the price of non-traded goods in the Home 
country relative to the Foreign country. 
We illustrate the impact of the various shocks through a numerical example. We set the Home 
country to be small with n =0.2, assume that traded goods account for 30 % of the total 
consumption basket in the steady state (0 = 0.3), that there are decreasing returns to scale ( = 
0.25), and set the discount factor  to 0.95. We set the autoregressive coefficients for all shocks 
to 0.5.7 
We present the immediate impact of three different shocks on Home country variables in Figure 
1. The first shock is an increase in productivity in the Home traded sector (stripped bars), the 
second shock is a shift of Home demand towards non-traded goods (grey bars), and the final 
shock is an increase in the patience of Foreign agents (black bars). The increase in Foreign 
patience can be interpreted as a capital inflows shock. Another approach to assess the impact of 
financial conditions on the exchange rate is found in Benigno and Romei (2012) who consider a 
tightening of borrowing constraints, but abstract from the distinction between traded and non-
traded goods. For comparability, the magnitude of each shock set to lead to a unit real 
appreciation of the Home currency. 8 
The responses of the various variables depend crucially on the nature of the shock. A 
productivity gain in the traded sector leads agents to postpone consumption, especially of non-
traded goods, and accumulate Foreign assets as the real interest rate increases. Labor shifts 
towards the more productive traded sector and the country experiences an increase in output, 
entirely driven by the production of traded goods.  
A shock to the composition of demand leads to a reduction in overall consumption, which results 
from offsetting decrease in the consumption of traded goods and increase in the consumption of 
non-traded goods, which bids up their price. The country experiences an increase in overall 
output (measured in traded units), albeit smaller than following a productivity gain, with the 
sectoral composition of output and employment displaying a shift towards the non-traded sector. 
                                                            
7 Our results are not sensitive to the degree of persistence of shocks. 
8 One may notice that the relative price of non-traded goods in the Home country does not increase equally across all 
shocks, even though the real exchange rate impact is the same. This simply reflects the fact that the real exchange 
rate is also affected by the relative price of non-traded goods in the Foreign country. 
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As traded consumption falls by more than traded output, the country experiences a current 
account surplus. 
A capital inflows shock leads to a sizable current account deficit. Consumption increases across 
the board, but more so for traded goods. The sectoral composition of output shows a substantial 
heterogeneity with a shift of labor towards the non-traded sector that leads to a contraction in 
traded output. While overall output increases, this gain is smaller than following demand or 
productivity shocks. 
Figure 1 illustrates the central result of the model, namely that a given appreciation of the real 
exchange rate can be associated with sharply different situations. While overall output always 
increases, it does so by most after a productivity shock and by least after a capital inflows shock. 
The reaction of the current account differs across shocks, with a surplus after productivity gains 
in the traded sector and a deficit following a capital inflows shock that fuels a boom in 
consumption. 
 
3.4 The general case 
 
We now turn to the general case where the elasticities of substitution  and  can take more 
general values. As the analytical solution is complex, we focus on a numerical illustration. We 
keep the same parameters as in the previous section and assume that there is a moderate domestic 
bias in consumption ( = 0.3). We consider the same three types of shocks as under Figure 1, and 
contrast their impact depending on the values of  and . As shown below, the shocks do not 
necessarily lead to a real appreciation, and we thus cannot use the same presentation approach as 
in Figure 1. We therefore consider unit values for each of the shocks. 
The focus of this section is to show how our inferences from the simple model presented above 
are sensitive to the elasticities of substitution between traded and non-traded goods, and between 
Home and Foreign traded goods. Figure 2 shows the impact of a unit increase in Home traded 
productivity on variables in the Home country. In each panel we contrast the impact across 
different values for  (from 1 to 6, horizontal axis) and  (1, 3, 6, and infinity, with four different 
lines). The simple model presented above corresponds to the left-most point of the thick line. 
The main message from Figure 2 is that while the results are not too sensitive to the elasticity of 
substitution between traded and non-traded goods (the magnitudes of all movements tend to be 
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smaller when traded and non-traded goods are more substitutable), they are very sensitive to the 
elasticity between Home and Foreign traded goods. The most striking result is for the real 
exchange rate, as a productivity gain can lead to a real depreciation of the currency when Home 
and Foreign traded goods are poor substitutes. This can be understood by looking at the equation 
(10) for the real exchange rate. Higher productivity in the Home traded sector raises the price of 
Home non-traded goods, which leads to a real appreciation of the currency from the second term 
in (10). This is the well-known Harold-Balassa-Samuelson effect. The productivity gain also 
reduces the price of Home-produced traded goods, which is not set by the world market when 
traded goods are not identical. In the presence of domestic bias in traded consumption this lowers 
the price of the traded goods basket in the Home country relative to the corresponding basket in 
the Foreign country. This channel, captured by the first term in (10), lowers the Home consumer 
price index and leads to a real depreciation. If Home and Foreign traded goods are poor enough 
substitutes, the terms-of-trade channel dominates and the Home currency depreciates in real 
terms. 
A limited substitutability between traded goods of different origins leads to a higher output gain, 
higher consumption (as Home traded goods are cheaper), and a smaller current account surplus 
(or a deficit). The offsetting response of the sectoral output is muted, which along with the larger 
price movements leads to higher overall output in terms of the Home traded good. 
Turning to the consequences of a Home demand shift towards non-traded goods (Figure 3), we 
see that the sensitivity of the results to the elasticity of substitution between Home and Foreign 
traded goods is much less pronounced. The results are more sensitive to the elasticity of 
substitutions between traded and non-traded, with a higher elasticity dampening the movements 
of the various variables. Only the terms-of-trade are affected by the elasticity of substitution 
between Home and Foreign traded goods, but this sensitivity is muted when looking at the real 
exchange rate, which always appreciates following a demand shift by Home agents towards non-
traded goods. 
The responses to a unit shock in capital inflows, stemming from higher Foreign patience, are 
displayed in Figure 4. The results are sensitive to the degree of substitutability between different 
traded goods, but not to the point of reversing the real exchange rate movements, with a 
depreciation observed for all cases. The real appreciation of the currency is stronger when Home 
and Foreign traded goods are poor substitutes. The movements of output in all sectors are more 
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muted, and the overall output gain is reduced, and can even turn into a recession if traded and 
non-traded goods are close substitutes. The consumption boom is more moderate, which 
translates into a smaller current account deficit. 
Contrasting the patterns under a productivity gain with the ones following a capital flows shock, 
we see that a higher elasticity of substitution actually strengthens the contrast pointed in Figure 
1: it leads to a larger real appreciation and lower output gain (or even loss) following a capital 
flows shock, but raises the output gain following a productivity shock. Appreciations stemming 
from capital flows shocks are thus clearly less beneficial in terms of output than the ones 
stemming from productivity gains. 
Overall our numerical illustration of the general model reinforces the patterns shown for the 
simple one. A real appreciation due to a productivity improvement in the traded sector leads to 
an output boom in that sector and a current account surplus. An appreciation stemming from an 
increase in Foreign savings by contrast is associated with a credit fuelled consumption boom and 
a limited increase in overall output as resources shift towards the non-traded sector. 
 
4. The impact of large appreciations, capital surge and shock of productivity 
 
This section presents the concepts used in our analysis. We then identify the main stylized facts 
that emerge from contrasting times of large appreciations with other periods.  
 
4.1. Definitions 
 
Our focus is on the relation between large exchange rate appreciations and output, contrasting 
the pattern between appreciations associated with unusual developments in the financial sector 
from those associated with a strong increase in domestic productivity. 
To do so, we first need to define criteria in order to identify episodes of strong and sustained 
appreciation as well as strong changes in the financial markets and in terms of productivity. 
The limited number of studies of large appreciations does not provide a widely accepted rigorous 
numerical definition of what constitutes a “large appreciation”. Our selection reflects two 
aspects. First, as we are interested in the aggregate macroeconomic outcome, we focus on 
effective (rather than bilateral) exchange rates. Second, we define clear thresholds for the 
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exchange rate such that only lasting episodes are selected and not transitory jumps. An episode 
of large appreciation must meet the following two conditions: 
a. The real effective exchange rate remains stronger by at least 10 percent on average for 
the last three years (t-3) before for the appreciation to be recorded in t. Hence, t 
corresponds to the end of the three-year phase, such that: 
      1.0
2
)(ln)(ln
)(ln 32   ttt REERREERREER  
b. There was no depreciation of similar magnitude prior to the appreciation period  
      1.0
2
)(ln)(ln)(ln 653   ttt REERREERREER  
These two criteria are defined in terms of the real exchange rate. We can also add a restriction 
that focuses our analysis on episodes where the nominal exchange rate moves: 
c. The nominal effective exchange rate may be revalued by at least 10 percent or more 
relative to the average level in the past three years.  
      1.0
2
)(ln)(ln
)(ln 32   ttt NEERNEERNEER  
These criteria ensure that the identified episode display a large movement in the real exchange 
rate and that it does not constitute a “catch up” following a large depreciation of the currency.  
Table 1 presents the identified episodes. We find 107 such country/time episodes respecting the 
criteria a and b, and only 43 when the 3 criteria hold, missing some important episodes such as 
the appreciation of the Yuan in 2008-09 or of the Australian dollar and the South African rand in 
2010, among others. As a result, we focus our analysis on real appreciations (criteria a and b). 
Our definition excludes a number of appreciations that took place just after a currency crisis, 
such as those observed in Korea and Thailand after the Asian crisis. 
Financial market conditions are proxied by large (net and gross) capital inflows. Indeed, swings 
in international financial markets are a major driver of economic performance in emerging but 
also advanced economies as the current crisis highlights. For each country, capital inflows are 
measured as a percentage of GDP. Following Forbes and Warnock (2012), we define a surge in 
capital inflows (gross or net) as follows: 
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ܫ݂݈݊݋ݓݏ௧ ൒ ܫ݂݈݊݋ݓݏ௧തതതതതതതതതതതതതത ൅ ߪ௧     with ݐ ൌ 5, … , ܶ 
where Inflowst is the annual change in capital inflows, ܫ݂݈݊݋ݓݏ௧തതതതതതതതതതതതതത ൌ ሺ1/5ሻ ∑ ܫ݂݈݊݋ݓݏ௧ି௜ସ௜ୀ଴  
is the average change over the previous 5 years, and 
ߪ௧ ൌ ሺ∑ ሺܫ݂݈݊݋ݓݏ௧ି௜ െ ܫ݂݈݊݋ݓݏ௧തതതതതതതതതതതതതതሻଶସ௜ୀ଴ ሻ଴.ହ is the standard deviation of flows over the same 
period. A surge episode is thus a situation where the increase in inflows in a year is one standard 
deviation above the average increase over the five previous years. We consider two types of 
surge. A “gross surge” is an increase in the growth rate of gross capital inflows, while a “net surge” is an 
increase in the growth rate of net capital inflows. 9 
We also consider the role of global financial markets conditions, proxied by the VXO measure of 
risk perception. Specifically, VXO values greater than 25 are generally associated with a large 
amount of uncertainty, while values below 15 correspond to less stressful, even complacent, 
times in the markets. In our analysis below, we contrast the impact of appreciations in periods of 
moderate global risk perceptions (when VXO is lower than 15) from that in periods of high 
global risk perceptions (when VXO larger than 25). 
 
4.2. Descriptive statistics and stylized facts 
 
In order to identify key observed patterns in the relation between large appreciations and output 
growth, we first use descriptive statistics and event studies to infer overall stylized facts. Table 2 
presents the change in GDP, imports, exports, consumption, and investment growth rates as well 
as in credit to private sector as a percentage of GDP. We contrast the average values of these 
variables in times of large appreciations where the criteria a and b described above are met (top 
panel) with their values in times when either of the two criteria is not met (bottom panel). In each 
panel, we present the values for all countries, before contrasting developed and emerging 
economies. 
Three results stand out. First, international trade flows behave as one could expect. Episodes of 
large currency appreciations are associated with weaker export growth and higher import growth. 
                                                            
9 Gross capital inflows are the sum of inflows of direct investment, portfolio inflows, and other inflows. Net capital 
inflows are the difference between gross capital inflows and gross capital outflows (gross outflows being the sum of 
direct investment outflows, portfolio outflows, and other outflows). 
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The annual growth rate of real exports averages 5.2% during a strong appreciation, compared to 
6% otherwise. Similarly, large appreciations are associated with stronger growth in imports 
(8.9% on average against 5.4% in normal times). This first set of results supports the concerns 
related to the adverse competitiveness effect of large appreciations on net trade, with an 
appreciated currency reducing exports and boosting imports. Furthermore, the reactions differ 
across countries: the impact on exports is noticeable for the advanced economies, while the 
impact of imports is much stronger on emerging economies. 
Second, the pattern for net exports does not match the result for overall growth at all. While one 
may expect the adverse effect of the appreciation on net trade to correspond to weaker GDP 
growth, this is not the case. Instead, growth is similar on average during episodes of strong 
appreciation than during normal times (3.3%). Large appreciations are thus associated with other 
developments that offset the adverse impact on net exports. This is highlighted by our third 
stylized fact, namely that consumption and investment growth is stronger in times of large 
appreciations (4.4% and 5.1% respectively) than in normal times (3.7% and 3.3% respectively). 
A similar pattern is observed for credit growth in advanced economies (but not in emerging 
ones). Our results clearly underscore that one cannot draw a mechanical link between the impact 
of appreciations on trade flows on growth. Instead, one needs to assess the underlying drivers of 
the exchange rate and growth. 
The analysis of Table 2 only contrasts the average values of variables across normal times and 
times of high appreciations. We complement these static results by looking at the evolution of 
the variables through time. This is done in Figure 5, which shows the dynamics of GDP growth 
(5.a), as well as real exports, real imports, credit to GDP and the effective real exchange rate 
(5.b) around the time of large appreciations. The figure reports averages calculated for five types 
of episodes: (i) no appreciation (white bars), (ii) a strong appreciation (grey bars), (iii) a strong 
appreciation combined with a productivity increase (black bar), (iv) a strong appreciation 
combined with a surge of gross capital inflows (vertical stripped bars) and (v) a strong 
appreciation combined with a surge of net capital inflows (diagonal stripped bars). Based on the 
definition reported in section 4.1, the time of the appreciation is recorded after a three-year 
period of sustained increase in REER, as the top panel of Figure 5.b clearly shows. The timing of 
the shocks, productivity or capital inflows, is more flexible as they can occur contemporaneously 
(t) or with a lag (t-1). The goal is to capture on-going phenomenon in order to isolate different 
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underlying causes of the strong appreciation. The figure reports the evolution of the variables 
from three years before (t-3) the strong appreciation to three years after (t+3).  
Figure 5.a shows the average patterns of real GDP growth across all countries, as well as 
separately for advanced and emerging economies. Two key features emerge. First, emerging 
economies experience, on average, lower growth after a period of large appreciation, unless it is 
associated with a surge of capital inflows or a productivity shock. By contrast, the negative 
impact of a large appreciation on advanced economies is temporary (one year), and is followed 
by a growth recovery. Second, all economies report their best performance (i.e. persistently 
stronger growth) when a strong appreciation is accompanied by a productivity shock. 
Figure 5.b confirms the patterns seen in Figure 2. A large appreciation weakens exports and 
leads to a clear increase in imports. A strong appreciation combined with higher productivity 
boosts credit growth within 1 to 2 year after the appreciation, while the presence of a surge 
strengthens the credit after 2 years. 
The patterns presented in this section are consistent with our theoretical findings. However, our 
analysis only presents broad stylized facts, and does not offer a precise assessment of the role of 
capital flows surges and productivity on growth. In addition, the average values reported in Table 
2 are associated with sizable standard errors, showing that effects are highly heterogeneous. We 
therefore turn to a more formal assessment of the patterns. 
 
5. Evidence from a panel analysis 
 
In this section we refine the analysis using panel regressions. We focus on the determinants of 
overall GDP growth. Indeed, one potential explanation for the results presented in Table 2, 
which shows no difference for overall growth between times of large appreciation and other 
times, may be that these broad stylized facts do not control for the underlying economic shocks. 
Our econometric analysis allows us to more precisely assess whether different shocks, such as 
productivity or capital flows, have different implications for overall growth, differences that 
could be diluted in a broad average analysis. 
We use a panel regression analysis and account for countries specificities by including fixed 
effects to capture the differences in means and by relying on GLS estimators to allow for 
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difference in the variance by relying on GLS estimators.10 Our most general specification is as 
follows: 
ݕ௜௧ ൌ ܨ݅ݔ݁݀ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐ௜ ൅ ߚଵݕ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ෍ ߚଶ,௝ܴܧܧܴ௜,௧ି௝ ൅ ෍ ߚଷ,௝ܦܽ݌݌௜,௧ି௝
ଵ
௝ୀ଴
ଵ
௝ୀ଴
 
         ൅ ∑ ߚସ,௝ܦ݌ݎ݋݀௜,௧ି௝ ൅ ∑ ߚହ,௝ܦݏݑݎ݃݁௜,௧ି௝ଵ௝ୀ଴ଵ௝ୀ଴  
         ൅ ∑ ߚ଺,௝ܦ݌ݎ݋݀௜,௧ି௝ כ ܦܽ݌݌௜,௧ି௝ଵ௝ୀ଴ ൅ ∑ ߚ଻,௝ܦݏݑݎ݃݁௜,௧ି௝ כ ܦܽ݌݌௜,௧ି௝ଵ௝ୀ଴  
         ൅ ∑ ߚ଼,௝ܦ݌ݎ݋݀௜,௧ି௝ כ ܦݏݑݎ݃݁௜,௧ି௝ଵ௝ୀ଴ ൅ ∑ ߚଽ,௝ܦ݌ݎ݋݀௜,௧ି௝ כ ܦݏݑݎ݃݁௜,௧ି௝ כ ܦܽ݌݌௜,௧ି௝ଵ௝ୀ଴  
         ൅ ∑ ߚଵ଴,௝ܦݏݑݎ݃݁௜,௧ି௝ כ ܦܸܱܺ15ܮ௜,௧ି௝ଵ௝ୀ଴ ൅ ∑ ߚଵଵ,௝ܦݏݑݎ݃݁௜,௧ି௝ כ ܦܸܱܺ25ܪ௜,௧ି௝ଵ௝ୀ଴  
         ൅ ∑ ߚଵଶ,௝ܦݏݑݎ݃݁௜,௧ି௝ כ ܦܸܱܺ15ܮ௜,௧ି௝ כ ܦܽ݌݌௜,௧ି௝ଵ௝ୀ଴   
         ൅ ∑ ߚଵଷ,௝ܦݏݑݎ݃݁௜,௧ି௝ כ ܦܸܱܺ25ܪ௜,௧ି௝ כ ܦܽ݌݌௜,௧ି௝ଵ௝ୀ଴ ൅ ߝ௜௧ (14) 
where i and t are indexes of country and time, y is the growth rate of GDP, REER the growth rate 
of the real exchange rate (so that an increase denotes an appreciation). The various dummies are 
defined as follows. Dapp denotes a large appreciation (criteria a and b presented in section 4.1), 
Dprod a productivity increase, Dsurge a capital inflows surge (gross or net depending on the 
specific regressions), DVXO15L a period where the VXO is below 15, and DVXO25H a period 
where the VXO is above 25. 
2j measures how regular movements of the exchange rate are associated with growth. 3j shows 
whether a large appreciation has an additional effect on growth. 4j and 5j capture the growth 
impact of productivity and capital flows, respectively. 6j and 7j assess whether a large 
appreciation has a different impact on growth when it is associated with a productivity increase 
(6j) or a capital inflows surge (7j). 8j shows whether productivity and capital inflows shocks 
amplify each other, and 9j assesses whether that combination changes the growth effect of large 
appreciations. We can expect the impact of capital flows to differ depending on whether they 
take place at times of unusually high or low perceptions of risk. This conjecture is assessed by 
                                                            
10 Endogeneity between GDP and REER may bias these estimates. In an attempt to test the robustness of our findings, we  also run instrumental 
regressions, using lagged REER. The direction (signs of the results) is confirmed but, as expected, the statistical significance is weakened as 
standard errors are commonly larger with instrumental regressions. 
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the last four coefficients. 10j and 11j show whether the impact of capital flows surge is different 
when perception of risk are unusually low (10j) or high (11j). Finally, 12j and 13j assess 
whether large appreciations have a different impact when they are associated with capital flows 
surge at times of unusual risk perceptions.  
The estimated coefficients and their corresponding p-values are reported in Tables 3 and 4. Table 
3 focuses on contemporaneous effects (in the regressions presented in Table 3, 1 = 0 and there 
are no lags of explanatory variables, j=0), while we allow for lags in Table 4. In each table, we 
present specifications of growing complexity. First, we focus on strong appreciation and shocks 
and abstract from interactions between the various variables (first four columns of coefficients 
and p-values, 1j to 5j). Second, we allow for differentiated effects of large appreciations when 
there are productivity or capital flows shocks (1j to 7j). We next allow for interactions between 
surge and productivity (1j to 9j). Fourth, we let the impact of capital inflows to differ in times 
of unusual risk perceptions (1j to 11j). Finally we allow the impact of large appreciations to 
differ in such times (1j to 13j). For each specification, we estimate two regressions. In the first 
one surges are measured in terms of gross capital inflows, while they are measured in terms of 
net inflows in the second one. 
The signs and significance of the various coefficients are relatively robust across the different 
models. Starting with the contemporaneous results of Table 3, five points emerge. First, while a 
real appreciation is associated with higher growth (2>0), the relation is not monotonous as a 
strong appreciation has a negative impact on real GDP growth (3 varies from -1.07 and -1.47 
depending on the specification considered). Second, growth is boosted in times of high 
productivity (4 > 0) and capital flows surges (5 > 0), but the impact of the latter is of smaller 
magnitude. This pattern is in line with the model where growth increases more following a 
productivity shock than following a capital flows shock. Third, productivity shocks also affect 
the link between appreciation and growth. While a large appreciation is adverse for growth (3 < 
0), this is not the case when the appreciation is accompanied by higher productivity (6 is 
between 1.38 and 1.46 when considering gross surge in the model and between 1.05 and 1.30 for 
net surge). By contrast, the effect of surges of capital tends to be smaller, and mostly non-
significant (7 lies between 0.87 and 2.02 for gross surge but close to 0 for net surge). While 
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productivity shocks and surge matter (especially for the former), their interaction does not affect 
growth or the link between growth and appreciation. 
The fourth result is that large appreciations associated with capital inflows surges have an 
adverse effect on growth when they happen in times of unusual risk perceptions, although the 
exact effect is sensitive to the exact specification considered. When considering surges of gross 
capital inflows, we observe a sizable negative effect of a large appreciation when investors are 
unusually tolerant of risk (12 = -2.50). When we consider surges of net inflows instead, the 
adverse effect at times of tolerance for risk is somewhat smaller and non-significant (12 = -
1.88), but we observe a sizable and significant effect at times of high sensitivity to risk, even 
when the country is not faced with a large appreciation (11 = -1.09). Our analysis thus indicates 
that when investors are less concerned about the riskiness of their portfolios, countries that are 
large recipients of gross inflows tend to be faced with reduced growth prospects when their 
currency appreciates. In times of global crisis, when investors are not tolerant of risk, a country 
that attracts net foreign inflows (and can thus be seen as a safe haven) tends to suffer. 
The final point emerging from our analysis is that growth is more favorable when the country 
experiences higher productivity than when it is faced with surges of capital flows, even taking 
the interaction with appreciation into account. Specifically, 4+6 exceeds 5+7 
(+10+11+12+13). This is in line with our theoretical analysis, which shows that even though a 
capital flows shock boosts growth, it does so by less than a productivity shock with the same 
impact on the real exchange rate. 
Table 4 presents the results when we include one lag for all variables. While the results are 
broadly in line with those of Table 3, we also observe some differences, mostly in terms of the 
impact of large appreciations combined with capital inflows surges at times of unusual attitudes 
to risk. When we consider surges in gross capital flows, we observe a significant negative effect 
on growth at times of high tolerance to risk (12,0 =-2.67), as in Table 3. When considering surges 
in net flows, we observe a significant adverse effect only at times of limited tolerance for risk. 
This effect materializes only with a lag and when combined with a large appreciation (13,1 =-
4.17), whereas we observe even without an appreciation in Table 3. Another difference is that the 
combination of a net inflows surge, productivity shock, and a strong appreciation boosts growth 
(9,0 =4.21), a feature that is not observed in Table 3. 
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6. Conclusion  
 
This paper investigates the connection between strong appreciations and growth. Our main 
message is that one cannot draw a simple link between the two variables, and instead needs to 
consider the specific shock behind the exchange rate appreciation. 
Using a simple model, we show that appreciations stemming from productivity improvements 
are associated with a stronger economic performance than appreciations stemming from easier 
borrowing conditions in world financial markets. We then highlight patterns in a dataset of 68 
countries for the period 1960-2011 that are consistent with these theoretical predictions.  
We establish three main stylized facts. First, and as expected, large exchange rate appreciations 
are associated with weaker export growth and stronger import growth, compared to normal 
times. However, the second result is that this does not translate into a similar pattern for output 
growth, which is stable in the wake of a large appreciation, suggesting that other factors are 
sufficiently powerful to offset the effect through trade. Third, there is substantial heterogeneity 
across appreciation episodes. Appreciations that are associated with a surge in capital inflows are 
characterized by weaker growth compared to episodes with productivity shock. 
A more formal assessment of the impact on growth using panel estimates shows that large 
appreciations are detrimental, unless they are associated with productivity increases. We also 
observe that global risk perceptions matter. Surge of gross capital inflows at times of unusual 
tolerance towards risk have an adverse effect on growth when they lead to a large appreciation. 
Surges of net inflows in times of stress also lower growth, even when we do not observe a large 
appreciation. 
In terms of policy implications, our analysis shows that policy should not be designed solely in 
response to exchange rate movements, but instead needs to identify the driving factors. Financial 
inflows and credit booms emerge as sources of concern. These however are likely to be best 
dealt with through targeted management of capital flows and credit growth, for instance using 
macroprudential tools. A policy aimed at the exchange rate, which is merely a consequence of 
the underlying shocks, could well be too blunt a tool to effectively address legitimate policy 
concerns. 
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Appendix: complete solution of the model 
 
A.1 Consumption allocation 
 
The allocation of consumption in the Home country is: 
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The corresponding relations in the Foreign country are: 
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A.2 Market clearing and intertemporal constraints 
 
Using the intratemporal consumption allocation, the clearing conditions for the non-traded 
goods (1) are written as: 
 
  
 
   




























1*
,
*
,
*
1
1*
1*
1
,,
1
1
1
)(
1
)1)(1(
)(
1
)1(
tNtNt
ttt
t
t
tNtNt
ttt
t
t
LAC
R
R
n
LAC
R
R
n
 
The Home intertemporal constraint in terms of traded goods (2) is written as: 
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The Foreign intertemporal constraint in terms of traded goods (3) is written as: 
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The clearing of the market for Home traded goods (4) is written as: 
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A.3 Real interest rate and labor allocation 
 
Using the intratemporal consumption allocation, the real interest rates in terms of 
consumption baskets (7) are written as: 
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The allocations of labor (8)-(9) are written as: 
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A.4 Log-linear approximations 
 
In terms of log-linear approximations, we write the market clearing conditions for non-
traded goods (1) as: 
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The market clearing for the Home traded good (4) is: 
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The Euler equations (6) are (where 0011 /)1(   CtCt rdr ): 
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The labor allocations (8)-(9) are: 
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TABLE AND CHART APPENDIX 
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Table 1. Episodes of appreciation 
Argentina  1979‐1979  Hong Kong  1973‐1974  Philippines  1996‐1996  Latvia 
1998‐
2000 
1981‐1981  1992‐1994 2008‐2008
2008‐
2009
1991‐1991  1996‐1998  Poland  1994‐1998  Lithuania 
1995‐
2001 
1999‐1999  Hungary  1992‐1994  2001‐2002 
2009‐
2009 
Australia  1973‐1974  2002‐2004  2006‐2006  Nicaragua 
1986‐
1987 
2003‐2005  2008‐2008  2008‐2008 
2009‐
2009 
2010‐2010  Indonesia  1977‐1977  Portugal  1974‐1975  Romania 
1998‐
1999 
Brazil  1990‐1991  2003‐2004  1990‐1992 
2005‐
2007 
1997‐1997  2006‐2007  Russia  2004‐2008  Slovak Rep.
2003‐
2009 
2007‐2008  Ireland  2003‐2004  Singapore  1975‐1975 
2010‐2010  2008‐2008  2008‐2008  Taiwan 
1974‐
1974 
Canada  2004‐2007  Israel  1983‐1983  South Africa  2010‐2010 
1982‐
1982 
Chile  1995‐1995  Japan  1972‐1974  Spain  1979‐1980  Venezuela 
1995‐
1995 
1997‐1997  1977‐1978  1989‐1990 
1997‐
2001 
China  2008‐2009  1986‐1988  Sri Lanka  2009‐2010 
2009‐
2010 
Colombia  1995‐1997  1994‐1995  Switzerland  1973‐1976 
2005‐2005  Korea  2005‐2007  1995‐1995 
2007‐2008  Malaysia  1983‐1984  2010‐2010 
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Costa Rica  2010‐2010  Mexico  1974‐1975  Thailand  2006‐2007 
Czech Rep.  1996‐1996  1991‐1993  Turkey  1976‐1979 
1998‐1998  2000‐2002  1989‐1990 
2002‐2003  Netherlands 2003‐2003  2003‐2005 
2006‐2009 
New 
Zealand  1988‐1988 
United 
Kingdom  1979‐1981 
Denmark  1987‐1987  1997‐1997  1998‐1999 
Egypt  2008‐2010  2005‐2005  United States  1982‐1985 
Euro Area  1973‐1973  Norway  2002‐2002  1998‐1998 
1986‐1987  Peru  1979‐1979  Uruguay  1992‐1995 
2008‐2008  1989‐1989  2008‐2010 
Finland  1975‐1976  1991‐1991  Bolivia  2009‐2010 
Germany  1973‐1973  1993‐1993  Estonia  2008‐2008 
2008‐2008  Iceland  1988‐1988 
               2005‐2005       
Appreciation for criteria a and b, in bold for a,b,c
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Table 2 : Summary statistics: impact of a strong appreciation      
In situation of strong appreciation (ab=1) 
  GDP Exports Imports Consumption Investment Cred_GDP
All countries             
Mean 3,3  5,2  8,9  4,4  5,1  2,3 
Std. dev. 4,2  7,5  12,1  6,2  7,1  11,4 
Developed  
countries       
 mean  3,1  4,6  7,7  3,6  4,9  4,6 
Std. dev. 3,1  7,3  11,3  2,8  6,7  14,2 
EMEs countries 
 mean  3,4  5,5  9,9  5,0  5,2  0,9 
Std. dev. 4,8  7,7  12,7  7,8  7,3  9,1 
  
Not in situation of strong  appreciation  (ab=0) 
  GDP Exports Imports Consumption Investment Cred_GDP
  
All countries 
Mean 3,3  6,0  5,4  3,7  3,3  1,6 
Std. dev. 3,8  9,0  11,4  4,0  0,1  9,0 
Developed  
countries       
 mean  3,0  5,9  5,0  3,0  2,4  2,3 
Std. dev. 3,0  8,2  9,4  3,0  0,1  10,0 
EMEs countries 
 mean  3,6  6,1  6,0  5,2  4,5  0,7 
Std. dev. 4,7  10,1  14,4  5,4  0,1  7,2 
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 GDP on  gross surge  net surge 
gross 
surge  net surge  gross surge  net surge 
gross 
surge  net surge 
gross 
surge  net surge 
                                
                                                              
C  3.06  0.00  3.06 0.00 3.11 0.00 3.09 0.00 3.13 0.00  3.10 0.00 3.15 0.00 3.12 0.00 3.15 0.00 3.12 0.00 
real exch.  0.12  0.00  0.12 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.11 0.00  0.12 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.11 0.00 
app.  ‐1.05  0.01  ‐1.07 0.01 ‐1.44 0.00 ‐1.36 0.00 ‐1.44 0.00  ‐1.33 0.01 ‐1.47 0.00 ‐1.35 0.00 ‐1.46 0.00 ‐1.34 0.01 
productivity  1.76  0.00  1.74 0.00 1.57 0.00 1.57 0.00 1.42 0.00  1.50 0.00 1.37 0.00 1.45 0.00 1.38 0.00 1.45 0.00 
surge  0.70  0.00  0.69 0.00 0.61 0.01 0.64 0.01 0.49 0.04  0.59 0.02 0.64 0.09 0.75 0.04 0.53 0.17 0.73 0.05 
app.*productivity            1.41 0.04 1.30 0.07 1.38 0.06  1.05 0.16 1.46 0.05 1.14 0.13 1.46  0.05  1.12  0.13 
app.*surge            0.98 0.17 0.49 0.54 0.87 0.26  0.16 0.85 0.98 0.20 0.27 0.77 2.02  0.07  0.54  0.73 
surge*productivity                    0.69 0.21  0.31 0.60 0.64  0.25  0.28  0.63  0.63  0.26  0.23  0.70 
app*surge*prod.                    0.47 0.80  1.61 0.40 0.39  0.83  1.52  0.42  0.93  0.53  1.88  0.24 
surge*vxo15L                                ‐0.07 0.86  0.02  0.97  0.12  0.78  0.18  0.69 
surge*vxo25H                                ‐0.69 0.20  ‐0.92 0.12  ‐0.54 0.35  ‐1.09  0.08 
app*surge*vxo15L                                                ‐2.50 0.05  ‐1.88  0.27 
app*surge*vxo25H                                               ‐1.47 0.31  1.35  0.47 
Table 3: Static regression analysis, coefficients and p‐values 
Table 3 reports the coefficients and the corresponding p‐values when regressing GDP growth on the list of variables listed in the 1st column. With the exception of real exch, which is the 1st difference of 
exchange rate, these variables are dummies capturing the episodes of interest:  app for strong appreciation, productivity for  productivity shocks, surge for capital inflows (net and gross) and DVXO for the 
two levels of VXO considered. The variable “surge” is either gross surge or net surge in the regression. The table reports the results based on the estimation of the full model (last four columns) and 4 
restricted versions. 
The coefficients in bold are significant at, at least 10%, and the p‐values are in italic. 
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 GDP on 
   
gross surge 
   
net surge 
   
gross surge 
   
net surge 
   
gross surge 
   
net surge 
  
gross surge 
   
net surge 
                                                  
GDP(‐1)  0.29 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.30 0.00  0.30 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.31 0.00
C  1.79 0.00 1.80 0.00 1.82 0.00 1.80 0.00  1.79 0.00 1.76 0.00 1.80 0.00 1.76 0.00
real exch.  0.11 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.12 0.00  0.12 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.12 0.00
real exch.(‐1)  ‐0.05 0.00 ‐0.05 0.00 ‐0.05 0.00 ‐0.05 0.00  ‐0.05 0.01 ‐0.05 0.01 ‐0.04 0.01 ‐0.05 0.01
app.  ‐1.33 0.01 ‐1.28 0.01 ‐1.29 0.01 ‐1.20 0.02  ‐1.30 0.01 ‐1.18 0.02 ‐1.30 0.01 ‐1.20 0.02
app.(‐1)  0.32 0.51 0.28 0.56 0.30 0.54 0.25 0.61  0.25 0.61 0.22 0.65 0.27 0.59 0.21 0.67
productivity  2.01 0.00 2.02 0.00 1.94 0.00 2.10 0.00  1.95 0.00 2.13 0.00 1.95 0.00 2.11 0.00
productivity(‐1)  0.39 0.14 0.36 0.18 0.20 0.54 0.13 0.70  0.20 0.55 0.14 0.69 0.20 0.55 0.12 0.72
surge  0.66 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.61 0.01 0.72 0.01  0.96 0.01 1.07 0.00 0.86 0.02 1.04 0.01
surge(‐1)  0.92 0.00 0.66 0.00 0.79 0.00 0.51 0.03  1.04 0.01 0.45 0.16 0.96 0.02 0.32 0.33
app.*productivity  1.16 0.10 1.17 0.12 0.85 0.23 0.61 0.41  0.84 0.23 0.56 0.46 0.78 0.27 0.53 0.48
(app.*productivity)(‐1)  0.22 0.81 0.52 0.57 0.42 0.67 0.91 0.37  0.49 0.63 0.99 0.33 0.41 0.68 0.99 0.33   
app.*surge  0.52 0.48 0.10 0.91 0.11 0.88 ‐0.57 0.54  0.18 0.80 ‐0.64 0.51 1.29 0.21 0.00 1.00   
(app.*surge)(‐1)  ‐0.10 0.89 0.39 0.59 0.02 0.98 0.58 0.44  0.06 0.94 0.61 0.41 0.88 0.37 2.34 0.05   
surge*productivity          0.33 0.53 ‐0.34 0.53  0.18 0.73 ‐0.50 0.36 0.17 0.75 ‐0.52 0.33   
(surge*productivity)(‐1)          0.85 0.07 0.92 0.05  0.83 0.09 0.85 0.07 0.83 0.09 0.86 0.07   
app*surge*prod.          2.04 0.37 3.39 0.14  2.33 0.31 3.77 0.11 2.89 0.14 4.21 0.03   
(app*surge*prod.)(‐1)          ‐0.57 0.80 ‐1.18 0.59  ‐0.39 0.86 ‐1.02 0.64 0.13 0.95 ‐0.50 0.77   
surge*vxo15L                   ‐0.34 0.38 ‐0.31 0.45 ‐0.15 0.72 ‐0.13 0.76   
(surge*vxo15L)(‐1)                   ‐0.39 0.33 0.22 0.52 ‐0.27 0.51 0.38 0.27   
surge*vxo25H                   ‐0.78 0.17 ‐0.89 0.15 ‐0.68 0.26 ‐1.07 0.11   
(surge*vxo25H)(‐1)                   ‐0.52 0.40 ‐0.22 0.70 ‐0.28 0.66 0.23 0.70   
app*surge*vxo15L                      ‐2.67 0.08 ‐2.50 0.19   
(app*surge*vxo15L)(‐1)                      ‐0.85 0.48 ‐1.65 0.21   
app*surge*vxo25H                      ‐1.27 0.48 0.96 0.64   
(app*surge*vxo25H)(‐1)                      ‐2.13 0.22 ‐4.17 0.01
The coefficients in bold are significant at, at least 10%, and the p‐values are in italic. See footnote on Table 3 for more information on the variables 
Table 4: Dynamic regression analysis, coefficients and p‐values 
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Figure 1: Immediate impact of shocks in the simple model 
 
 
 
All shocks are parametrized to lead to a unit real appreciation. Coefficients:  = 0.25, n = 0.2, 0 
= 0.3, 0 = 0.95,  = 1,  = infinity, T = N = b = g = 0.5 
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Figure 2: Increase in Home traded productivity, general model 
 
 
 
  = 1   = 3   = 6   = infinity 
 
Coefficients:  = 0.25, n = 0.2, 0 = 0.3, 0 = 0.95,  = 0.3, T = N = b = g = 0.5 
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Figure 2 (continued) 
 
 
 
  = 1   = 3   = 6   = infinity 
 
Coefficients:  = 0.25, n = 0.2, 0 = 0.3, 0 = 0.95,  = 0.3, T = N = b = g = 0.5 
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Figure 3: Shift of Home consumption towards non-traded, general model 
 
 
 
  = 1   = 3   = 6   = infinity 
 
Coefficients:  = 0.25, n = 0.2, 0 = 0.3, 0 = 0.95,  = 0.3, T = N = b = g = 0.5 
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Figure 3 (continued) 
 
 
 
  = 1   = 3   = 6   = infinity 
 
Coefficients:  = 0.25, n = 0.2, 0 = 0.3, 0 = 0.95,  = 0.3, T = N = b = g = 0.5 
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Figure 4: Increase in Foreign patience, general model 
 
 
 
  = 1   = 3   = 6   = infinity 
 
Coefficients:  = 0.25, n = 0.2, 0 = 0.3, 0 = 0.95,  = 0.3, T = N = b = g = 0.5 
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Figure 4 (continued) 
 
 
 
  = 1   = 3   = 6   = infinity 
 
Coefficients:  = 0.25, n = 0.2, 0 = 0.3, 0 = 0.95,  = 0.3, T = N = b = g = 0.5 
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Figure 5: event-case analysis, average of the variable considered 
5.a: Impact of a strong appreciation at time t on GDP 
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5.b. Impact of a strong appreciation at time t for all economies on  
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